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Submission on Financial Planning Association Consultation Paper 
By 
Stephen Corones* 
This Submission is confined to the proposals in relation to compliance with the Best Interests duty 
(Part B) and the provision of Scaled Advice (Part C) in the FPA Consultation Paper, Modifications to 
the FPA Code of Professional Practice to incorporate FoFA, released in October 2012. 
B. Best Interests duty  
The general duty 
1. Section 961B(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) imposes a statutory duty on financial 
planners, namely that in giving advice to their clients they must ‘...act in the best interests of 
the client in relation to the advice’. No definition of ‘best interests’ is provided in the 
legislation. No guidance is provided at to how the courts are to apply this general statutory 
duty. Whilst it is possible that Courts will conceive of the duty as being ‘fiduciary-like’, the 
more likely scenario is that Courts will see it for what it really is – a ‘duty of care-like’ 
provision. This means that Courts will be looking for advice providers to show they are taking 
positive steps to comply with the duty. 
2. It seems that the test is not subjective in the sense that the Adviser will comply with the 
duty if the Adviser can demonstrate that he or she intended to act in the best interests of 
the client and to improve the financial position of the client. It seems that the test is 
objective and that the advice actually given in that particular context will not be in the best 
interests of the client if a hypothetical reasonable adviser would not have given that advice. 
This seems to follow from the objective tests adopted in relation to the safe harbour 
defence in s 961B(2). 
The safe harbour defence 
3. Rather than providing a definition what ‘best interests’ means, s 961B(2) sets out seven 
steps that, if taken by financial advisers, satisfy the general duty in s 961B(1). The steps are 
not meant to be ‘an exhaustive and mechanical checklist of what it is to act in the best 
interests of the client’,1 and advice providers can fulfil the general duty without necessarily 
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following all the steps in s 961B(2). The section is intended to function as a ‘safe harbour’ 
defence that providers of advice can rely on if they are suspected of not having fulfilled the 
general duty articulated in s 961B(1). 
4. Section 961B(2)(g) operates as a ‘catch-all’ provision. As the FPA Consultation Paper notes 
(at p 17), it was inserted to allay Treasury concerns that “clients may be offered financial 
product advice without sufficient consideration as to their personal needs”. It provides that 
the financial planner must have: Taken any other step that, at the time the advice is 
provided, would reasonably be regarded as being in the best interests of the client, given the 
client’s relevant circumstances. The test is an objective one: would a person with a 
‘reasonable level of expertise in the subject matter [of the advice], exercising care and 
objectively assessing the client’s relevant circumstances’, regard it as in the best interests of 
a client to take a step?2 Section 961E clarifies what may be required here, defining what 
would reasonably be regarded as being in the best interests of the client:  
It would reasonably be regarded as in the best interests of the client to take a step, if 
a person with a reasonable level of expertise in the subject matter of the advice that 
has been sought be the client, exercising care and objectively assessing the client’s 
relevant circumstances, would regard it as in the best interests of the client, given 
the client’s relevant circumstances, to take that step (Emphasis added).  
5. Section 961B imposes a statutory duty that is different from a fiduciary duty because it 
imposes prescriptive obligations on providers of financial advice. The core obligations of 
fiduciaries are treated in Australia as negative duties: fiduciaries must refrain from putting 
themselves in situations where conflicts of interest arise and must not profit from their 
position without obtaining the fully informed consent of the client.  
6. Under a statutory fiduciary duty financial advisers would be required to act in their clients’ 
interests, but not necessarily in their best interests. Section 961B requires more than this 
because it frames the obligation as a standard of conduct. Financial advisers are required to 
take positive steps to satisfy the duty to act in their clients’ best interests. Section 961B goes 
beyond what a statutory fiduciary duty would require. A statutory fiduciary duty may have 
prevented advisers from giving conflicted advice, but it would not have required them to 
work to give their client the best advice possible. The best interests duty, by contrast, 
requires advice providers to take positive steps to provide flexible, individualised advice for 
each specific client – advice based on the client’s circumstances, characteristics and needs: 
in short, advice that is in the client’s best interest. 
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7. The effect of such an approach is to shift the regulatory focus onto the conduct of advice 
providers, rather than their intentions or motivations. Other aspects of the FOFA legislation 
deal with providers’ motivations, namely the ban on conflicted remuneration and the duty 
of priority. Insofar as s 961B is concerned, however, provider conduct is central. This is a 
very different approach to that proposed in the Ripoll report. 
8. The steps in s 961B(2) are an attempt to add clarity to the best interests duty by setting out, 
one way advisers can comply with the duty. The problem is that the presence of the catch-all 
provision in s 961B(2)(g) makes these steps fundamentally uncertain. It requires advisers to 
take any other steps (additional to steps (a) – (f)) that ‘would reasonably be regarded as 
being in the best interests of the client’. The rationale for this provision is well intentioned: 
Parliament did not intend s 961B(2) to be an ‘exhaustive and mechanical checklist’.3 
Notwithstanding this, the effect of the provision is that it makes the steps in s 961B(2) open-
ended where their original purpose was to provide clarity. As a result of this uncertainty, 
some in the industry have argued that it will be impossible to design efficient processes for 
delivering advice. Arguably, however, this is precisely the point of the new law: the 
elimination of static and inflexible advice models that do not take full account of the client’s 
relevant circumstances. ASIC’s proposed guidance on complying with the best interests duty 
mentions that what is needed to comply with the obligation is different in each case, and 
advisers will be expected to exercise their own judgment.4  
9. Given the uncertainty surrounding the best interests duty, the Courts will play an important 
role in clarifying what is required of advice providers. However, due to the cost of litigation, 
interpretation of the best interests duty is likely to fall on the FOS in the first instance. It may 
be some time before test cases start coming through the Courts. In the meantime, both 
consumers and advice providers will be required to bear the consequence of uncertainty: 
increased cost. 
10. The FPA observes (at p 10) that the “newly established Best Interest requirements in Law 
have been framed as a ‘fiduciary like’ concept”. In certain circumstances the common law 
already imposes a fiduciary duty upon providers of financial advice. The concept of the 
fiduciary duty in Australian law is proscriptive, not prescriptive. While it means advice 
providers who are fiduciaries act in their clients’ interests, it does not mean they necessarily 
have to act in their best interests. While the Government’s position appeared somewhat 
confused in the Information Pack, in the initial draft tranche of legislation the word 
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‘fiduciary’ was not used at all. This suggests that the Government did not feel that 
introducing a statutory fiduciary duty that would apply in all circumstances would have been 
sufficient to meet its core objective of improving the quality of financial advice, and thus 
promoting confidence in providers of financial advice. Rather, it appears, a more prescriptive 
set of obligations were required that went directly to the manner in which advice providers 
conduct their business. Despite this apparent intention, the question about whether the 
best interests duty has a ‘fiduciary character’ remains. It is unclear to what extent the best 
interests duty will be considered in light of fiduciary principles.  
11. The best interests duty approach in the Further Measures Act represents a departure from 
the idea of a statutory fiduciary duty. However, given that the duty was originally described 
as ‘fiduciary’ in the Information Pack and that that language remains in the Explanatory 
Memorandum, it is not clear that the tension between the two approaches has been 
resolved. Given the differences between the concept of a best interests duty and a fiduciary 
duty, the Courts are unlikely to interpret s 961B in light of fiduciary principles.  
12. The FPA Proposal to comply with the best interests duty includes the adoption four ethical 
duty principles: 
• Fair engagement 
• Professional competence 
• Professional diagnosis 
• Recommend in the best interests. 
The following points should be noted in relation to the adoption of these ethical duty 
principles.  
13. First, the term best interest ‘principles’ is somewhat misleading. It implies that complying 
with the best interests duty will not necessarily require positive action by the advice 
provider. Whilst it is possible that Courts will conceive of the duty as being ‘fiduciary-like’, 
the more likely scenario is that Courts will see it for what it really is – a ‘duty of care-like’ 
provision. This means that Courts will be looking for advice providers to show they are taking 
positive steps to comply with the duty. 
14. Secondly, ‘Principle 1: Fair Engagement’ could be improved. The Principle speaks of ‘a 
defined, client centric engagement process’. Under the FOFA reforms, no other process is 
acceptable. The FPA’s Code of Professional Practice should clearly state that sales-based 
advice models are no longer permissible under the new law. This means that any aspects of 
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the advice provider’s business that could be described as ‘salesman-like’ should be 
abandoned. 
15. Principle 3 ‘Professional Diagnosis’ should recognise that each client’s circumstances are an 
integral factor to consider in the giving of financial advice. Advice providers are not simply 
selling products that the client may have requested. They are required to give advice that 
could reasonably be considered to be aimed at improving their client’s financial situation. 
Thus, it is not just the client’s needs that are important – it is their relevant circumstances as 
well. The term relevant circumstances is defined in s 961B (2)(b) to mean:  
(i) the subject matter of the advice that has been sought by the client (whether 
explicitly or implicitly); and  
(ii) the objectives, financial situation and needs of the client that would 
reasonably be considered as relevant to advice sought on that subject matter  
16. Principles 1-3 generally give effect to the safe harbor steps in s 961B(2). The best interests 
duty adopts a highly contextualised approach to the giving of financial advice. The best 
interests duty requires advice providers to place the client and his or her relevant 
circumstances at the centre of the provider’s considerations and to always act in furtherance 
of that client’s best interests. As regards ethical principle 3, it is clear that a failure to 
diagnose correctly the client’s needs and objectives and as a consequence providing the 
wrong financial product would be a breach of the best interests duty. 
17. As regards ethical principle 4, ‘recommend in the best interests,’ the FPA proposal states 
that the financial planner should:  
Provide recommendations that satisfy Principles 1 to 3 and that meet the advice 
needs identified by the client. The Adviser should demonstrate that they intend to 
financially improve the client’s outcomes, whilst balancing the obligation that if 
there is no best interest fit solution within the client’s existing holding not within the 
Advisers authorised solutions, they should not make a specific financial product 
recommendation. (Emphasis added) 
18. Principle 4, however, introduces a subjective element which is not present in the safe 
harbour test of s 961B(2). In order to take advantage of the safe harbour it will not be 
sufficient to demonstrate that the financial planner had the subjective intention to 
financially improve the client’s outcomes. Rather, it will be necessary to demonstrate 
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objectively that the financial planner took all steps that would reasonably be regarded as 
being in the best interests of the client, given the client’s relevant circumstances.  
19. It is necessary to consider the character of the particular conduct of the particular financial 
planner in relation to the particular client, bearing in mind what matters of fact each knew 
about the other as a result of the nature of their dealings and the conversations between 
them. However, in order to benefit from the safe harbour, a hypothetical reasonable person 
with knowledge of all the surrounding circumstances would have to regard the advice as 
being in the best interests of the client. It would not be sufficient to demonstrate that the 
financial planner intended to do the right thing by the client and financially improve the 
client’s outcomes. 
20. The FPA Code of Professional Practice could be amended to require members to treat 
serving clients as the focus – and purpose – of their business. They must therefore do 
everything (within reason) to understand their client’s relevant circumstances, so that the 
advice they give can truly be described as tailored advice. The giving of standardised, non-
tailored advice is not permissible under the law, and should not be permissible under the 
new FPA Code of Professional Practice.   
 
Facilitating the provision of Scaled Advice (Part C) 
21. While FOFA’s primary goal is to raise the standard of financial advice, a second goal is to 
facilitate greater access to advice.5 As the Revised Explanatory Memorandum notes, one 
way to promote greater access is through facilitating ‘the provision of simple or limited 
advice’.6 During the consultation process (both the Exposure Draft phase and throughout 
the PJC inquiry into the FOFA Bills), the best interests duty was criticised for seemingly being 
incompatible with the provision of scaled advice.  
22. The Government’s response was to insert a legislative note, after s 961B(2)(g), that states:  
The matters that must be proved under subsection (2) relate to the subject matter of 
the advice sought by the client and the circumstances of the client relevant to that 
subject matter (the client’s relevant circumstances). That subject matter and the 
client’s relevant circumstances may be broad or narrow, and so the subsection 
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anticipates that a client may seek scaled advice and that the inquiries made by the 
provider will be tailored to the advice sought.  
23. Despite this legislative note, there are significant risks in the provision of scaled advice. ASIC, 
in its consultation paper on scaled advice, noted that it would be up to the financial planner 
to exercise his or her professional judgment in assessing whether giving scaled or limited 
advice would be in compliance with the best interests duty.7  
24. Financial planners should explain that the advice they give – including its 
comprehensiveness, and thus cost – will depend on what the financial planning advice 
category is. This discussion is what determines whether advice can be scaled or not. This 
discussion is thus a crucial part of the advice process.  
25. My suggestion here is that the FPA Code of Professional Practice should require financial 
planners to ask the same first question of all clients: ‘what is it that you are looking for in 
terms of financial planning advice: a specific advice category or broader advice?’ Ultimately, 
whether the giving of scaled advice is viable depends on the client’s answer to this question.  
26. The FPA has adopted the position that that scaled advice is only appropriate for the least 
complex advice categories namely: 
• Superannuation (Do I have enough (or the right) superannuation in place?); 
• Debt and financial problem solving (How do I get better financial control over my 
affairs?); 
• Saving and budgeting (How do I manage or improve my household cash flow?); 
• Insurance and protection (How do I protect the things that matter?). 
27. The FPA also requires that financial planners consider whether scaled advice is appropriate 
for particular types of client namely: 
• 20’s to 40’s – career and family builder; 
• 40’s to 50’s – mid-life consolidation; 
• 50’s to 60’s – pre-retirement planning for the post work future; and 
• 65+ – retirement.  
28. Once this discussion reveals the advice category and the type of client, the next issue is how 
to go about satisfactorily scaling advice (in other words, doing so without falling foul of the 
best interests duty). The FPA Consultation Paper provides good guidance here. The more 
complex the subject-matter of the advice, the more thoroughly the Adviser will have to 
consider the client’s relevant circumstances. In some cases, scaled advice will not be 
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appropriate. If a client type (50’s to 60’) seeks advice in broad terms as to how they should 
structure their finances in preparation for retirement, a financial planner is at risk of not 
complying with the best interests duty if they give scaled advice.  
29. Giving scaled advice, whilst complying with the best interests duty, should only be possible 
where there is an initial agreement between the client and the financial planner that any 
advice will only concern a specific advice category, product or issue. The financial planner 
should also be required to take great care to ensure the client appreciates the limited scope 
of the advice that is being given.8 Ultimately, a financial planner may be in a position where 
they know that it is not in the best interests of the client to scale advice. The best interests 
duty, especially the steps set out in s 961B(2) are designed to make sure providers gain that 
knowledge.  
30. The FPA Staged Advice Standard provides a mechanism for distinguishing between 
‘outcome-driven, product advice’ and ‘financial planning’ needs of clients. It provides a 
means for financial planners to identify when scaled personal advice is appropriate and 
when more comprehensive is required.  The Consultation Paper states (at pp 25-6) that 
financial planners will need to exercise ‘professional judgment’ in determining how to go 
about scaling advice. It emphasises the role played by professional judgment in advising 
which type of advice is more appropriate. Without the adoption of an industry standard and 
the provision of this sort of guidance, there is a real risk that financial planners will only 
provide comprehensive advice the cost of which will mean that some consumers will be 
denied access financial advice. 
31. The proposed Staged Advice Standard is a commendable effort in assisting financial planners 
in this regard. Publication of this standard might also serve to better inform consumers 
about the process of providing financial advice, and the kinds of issues that arise when they 
make particular advice requests. 
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